Marlton Nominates Three Highly Qualified and Independent Candidates for Election to 180 Degree Capital Corporation (“TURN”) Board of Directors

In This Article:

Marlton Seeks NAV Capital Returns and Accountability From Underperforming Management and Disengaged Directors

CHICAGO, Dec. 17, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- In connection with its nominations, Marlton Partners L.P. (together with its affiliates, “Marlton” or “we”) sent the below letter to all shareholders of 180 Degree Capital Corp. (NASDAQ: TURN). The full text of Marlton's letter can be viewed at the following link: https://www.marltonllc.com/_files/ugd/6ba84d_fd82a20ad15644d18642b9e5155950a8.pdf

“I am keenly aware of the expectations you have for 180 Degree Capital. You will judge our success based on the path of our stock price. We will do the same.” -Kevin Rendino in 1st Quarter 2017 Earnings Release

“How should we measure success? Appreciation of the price of our stock - 1st Quarter 2017 Earnings Call Presentation, slide 4

Dear Fellow Shareholders,

Since Kevin Rendino became the Chair and CEO of 180 Degree Capital Corp. (“TURN” or “Company”) in 2017, net asset value has fallen -37.3%.1 Meanwhile, TURN’s self-selected benchmarks, the Russell Microcap, Russell Microcap Value, and Russell 2000 Indices, are up +59.2%, +70.5%, +82.1%, respectively.2 By the end of November 2024, the fund’s discount to net asset value (“NAV”) stood at -26%.3

Eliminating this discount would immediately create over $12.5 million in value for the Company’s shareholders on a traded market capitalization of $36m.4

Marlton Partners L.P. (together with its affiliates, “Marlton” or “we”) first engaged with TURN in October of 2023, suggesting to Mr. Kevin Rendino, CEO and Chairman, and Mr. Daniel B. Wolfe, President, that the Company implement a Discount Management Program (“Program”).5 At the core of our proposal was a Conditionally Triggered Tender Offer, which would guarantee shareholders an exit in cash at or near NAV by a tender offer for 12.5% - 25% of issued share capital should the discount to NAV be greater than a reasonable threshold. This would provide shareholders with a fair opportunity to realize value, yet the Company responded with an evasive, non-committal program that fails to obligate or guarantee shareholder capital returns at NAV.

On August 27th, 2024 we requested a meeting with Lead Independent Director, Mr. Parker A. Weil, but this was ignored. We think it is telling that no current independent director has purchased stock over the past 2,315 days—6 years—save for Mr. Richard P. Shanley’s modest purchase of 2,000 shares, one year ago, on November 15th, 2023.6

The market has had more than seven years to assess the impact of Mr. Rendino and this Board. The results are clear: absentee oversight has failed shareholders. This failure underscores the urgent need for fresh perspectives, true boardroom independence, and a clear, binding commitment to return capital to shareholders at NAV. Without these changes, TURN's persistent underperformance and widening discount to NAV are unlikely to be resolved.