Sovereign Immunity Bars Suit by Inmate Burned Repairing Truck, Appeals Court Rules
ALM Media
Updated
With one of three judges "reluctantly" concurring, a Georgia Court of Appeals panel has reversed a trial court and ruled against an inmate who was badly burned while doing maintenance work on a garbage truck.
The court said the city of Columbus was protected by sovereign immunity because the truck being repaired was not in "use" at the time.
In a case of first impression, the ruling said 2005 amendments to the state's sovereign immunity law mean that only the "negligent use" of such a vehicle would waive Columbus' sovereign immunity protection, wrote Judge Charles Bethel with the concurrence of Judges Elizabeth Branch and Christopher McFadden.
Since the truck was not being used as a vehicle at the time, the Columbus Consolidated Government had not waived its sovereign immunity, Bethel wrote.
In a special concurrence, McFadden wrote that he was uncomfortable with the decision, even though he agreed it was correct, given prior court interpretation of the law. McFadden urged lawmakers to reconsider the statutes to correct unfair consequences the Legislature likely did not intend.
The injured man, Franklin Woody, has "no avenue at all" to recover for his injuries, said his lawyer Stephen Hodges of Columbus' Philips Branch & Hodges.
Hodges said he and firm colleague Brian Worstell were considering an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.
"Obviously, we think it's manifestly unjust, but we respect the court's decision," Hodges said.
The city is represented by team of attorneys from Columbus' Page Scrantom Sprouse Tucker & Ford including James Clark Jr., LaRae Moore, Alan Snipes and Tyler Cashbaugh.
"From where we sit, of course, this looks like a good opinion based on the plain and clear reading of the statute," said Moore. "Our whole argument was based on the fact that Mr. Woody's case did not involve the use of a motor vehicle; the interpretation of the word 'use' as propounded by the plaintiff was not consistent with the case law."
According to Hodges and the appellate opinion, Woody was injured in 2011 when he was an inmate at the Muscogee County Prison, which is operated by the Columbus Consolidated Government. He was working at the city's large truck maintenance facility and was ordered to do some spot-welding on the body of a garbage truck.
"They didn't give him any protective gear, just a cotton inmate uniform," Hodges said. Sparks from the welding torch set the fabric ablaze, and Woody suffered third-degree burns over 30 percent of his body; he has since undergone multiple surgeries, Hodges said.
Woody brought a personal injury suit against Columbus, , and the city moved for a judgment on the pleadings arguing that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. Muscogee County Superior Court Judge Bobby Peters found that two Georgia statutes waived the city's immunity and rejected the motion; Columbus appealed.
As Bethel's opinion explained, prior to 2005 political subdivisions of the state, including cities, were authorized to buy insurance "by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation or use of any motor vehicle," and sovereign immunity for any subject claims was waived to the extent of that insurance.
Under the 2005 amendments, the Legislature added a sentence saying that sovereign immunity was waived for claims "for the negligent use of covered motor vehicle." It also added a new code section, OCGA 36-92-2, setting out maximum dollar amounts for such claims. The new law barred any claims above those sums unless a municipality's policy provided for higher coverage if a municipality opts to purchase insurance.
Under the code section, damages for a single death or injury is capped at $500,000.
In 2012's Gates v. Glass 291 Ga. 350, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the laws worked to create a "two-tier scheme" by which local governments may be deemed to have waived sovereign immunity.
"The first tier requires local entities to waive sovereign immunity up to certain prescribed limits for incidents involving motor vehicles regardless of whether they procure automobile liability insurance," wrote Bethel, quoting the high court's ruling. "The second tier provides for the waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent a local entity purchases liability insurance in an amount exceeding the limits prescribed in OCGA 36-92-2."
The practical effect, Bethel wrote, is that first-tier waivers can only apply to "negligent use" claims, and second-tier waivers only apply to cases in which a municipality opted to purchase insurance. There is no evidence Columbus had such insurance, the opinion said.
Bethel wrote that it is "undisputed" that the garbage truck "was immobile and undergoing maintenance" when accident occurred. "With that in mind, we must conclude that Columbus' vehicle was not being 'used' as a garbage truck when Woody sustained his injuries," and that sovereign immunity was not waived.
McFadden concurred fully in the opinion, but with strong reservations.
"The majority holds, and I reluctantly agree, that a first-tier waiver applies only to losses 'arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle [up to the limits] provided in Code Section 36-92-2.'"
"This, the majority holds, and I reluctantly agree, is in contrast to the broader scope of a second-tier waiver, which is effected by the purchase of insurance" which covers losses based on ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a vehicle.
Since Columbus had no insurance to effect a second-tier waiver, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, McFadden wrote.
But, he wrote, the law as interpreted "lead[s] to an anomaly the General Assembly certainly did not intend."
Hypothesizing a case in which a municipality purchased insurance but for coverage below the $500,000 statutory limit, someone injured by the negligent maintenance of a city vehicle and claiming damages within the policy limits would nonetheless be barred by sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, he wrote, a city that purchased insurance coverage of even one dollar more than the statutory limit would be subject to a damage claim and not protected by sovereign immunity.
"I see no reason for this disparate treatment" of the two hypothetical claimants, McFadden wrote.
McFadden postulated that a different reading of the law would allow any purchase of liability insurance to be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity to the policy's limits, "whether or not the amount of that insurance exceeds the dollar value prescribed in OCGA 36-92-2."
But the Gates decision and requirements that statutes relating to sovereign immunity be "strictly construed" in its favor require a reversal of Peters' order, he said.
"I respectfully suggest that the General Assembly reconsider these provisions," McFadden wrote
