Defendant's Rights Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Speedy Trial Excludible Delay
Commonwealth v. Mills, PICS Case No. 17-1043(Pa. June 20, 2017) Saylor, C.J.; Wecht, Todd and Donohue, J.J., concurring (9 pages).
The trial court properly found that defendant did not receive a speedy trial in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 since certain time attributable to the normal progression of this case, and during which the Commonwealth was not trial-ready, did not constitute "delay" for purposes of Rule 600. The court reinstated a trial court order dismissing the charges against defendant.
The Commonwealth charged defendant with a series of crimes, including attempted murder, on June 6, 2011. At a status conference held in September, the matter was scheduled for trial on April 2, 2012. However, at a status meeting on March 20, 2012, the Commonwealth advised the trial court that it was not yet ready to provide complete discovery, that the assigned assistant district attorney had a vacation scheduled for the date of the trial and that the Commonwealth contemplated DNA testing of defendant's genetic material. The trial court granted the commonwealth's request for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for Sept. 10, 2012. After the trial date was again continued, defendant filed a Rule 600 motion to dismiss for failure to commence a trial within 365 days from the date on which the criminal complaint was filed. Defendant conceded that several weeks should be exclude from the 365-day calculation. However, the parties disputed whether 174 of the days between the filing of the criminal complaint and the status conference should also be excluded from the relevant period. The commonwealth relied on precedent holding that periods of judicial delay are excludible from the calculation under Rule 600. The instructions of Rule 600 afford the prosecution leeway to proceed, without any diligence, to cause up to 365 days of delay in the commencement of any trial, according to the commonwealth. The trial court rejected this argument and enforced Rule 600's main directive by granting dismissal of the charges against defendant for failure to provide a speedy trial. On appeal to this court, he argued that by attempting to fairly account for delay within the contours of Rule 600, the court never meant to transform the rule's requirement to effectively toll the 365-day period throughout all periods of ordinary trial preparation. The court agreed with defendant that time attributable to the normal progression of a case is not "delay" for purposes of Rule 600. While periods of judicial delay are excludible from calculation under the rule, courts of original jurisdiction must apply judgment in distinguishing delay attributable to the court and that which should be allocated to a party. Where a trial-ready prosecutor must wait several months due to a court calendar, the time should be treated as "delay" for which the commonwealth is not accountable. In this matter, however, the commonwealth did not claim to be ready for trial during the disputed 174 days. As such, the Superior Court erred in reversing the order of dismissal.
Justice Wecht concurred, arguing that judicial delay only becomes relevant to the analysis after the commonwealth has proven its compliance with the due diligence mandate.