Leading Independent Third-Party Proxy Advisors Recommend Dynacor Shareholders Vote Against Changing Board Size and Against Election of the Dissident’s Nominee using only the Gold Proxy

In This Article:

MONTREAL, April 07, 2025--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dynacor Group Inc. (TSX: DNG) ("Dynacor" or the "Corporation"), is pleased to announce that Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") and Glass Lewis & Co., LLC ("Glass Lewis"), leading independent proxy advisory firms, have recommended that Dynacor shareholders vote AGAINST fixing the Dynacor board size to nine and AGAINST electing Robert Leitz to Dynacor’s board using the Dynacor management GOLD form of proxy or voting instruction form (together the "Gold Proxy") at the upcoming Special Meeting of Shareholders (the "Requisitioned Meeting").

Glass Lewis’ Commentary

In making its recommendations to vote the GOLD Proxy, Glass Lewis takes issue with iolite Capital Management AG (the "Dissident") ignoring Dynacor’s strong long-term performance, its dismissal of the Corporation’s capital requirement disclosure on its expansion plans, the Dissident’s short-term perspectives, and Robert Leitz’s inexperience on publicly traded boards:

  • "…iolite's case does not, in our view, incorporate adequate detail or a sufficiently comprehensive analytical lookback in relation to the Company's generally strong performance, and further seems to understate or dismiss potentially material capital requirements prospectively associated with Dynacor's messaged growth tack. Coupled with what we consider to be a fairly rapid acceleration in the Dissident's engagement methodology…we are concerned that the contemplated election of Mr. Leitz, who does not appear to have prior public company board experience, hinges too heavily on short-term factors."

Glass Lewis notes that from its analysis, Dynacor’s capital raise was justifiable, and its terms were in line with capital raises in the space:

  • "Cast against extant liquidity (i.e. cash and STI of US$25.8 million as of December 31, 2024) and the US$22.1 million derived from Dynacor's scrutinized capital raise, it is not immediately clear to us that the Company's effort to secure additional liquidity was plainly unreasonable."

  • "…we consider the Company's legacy ability to execute effectively and, it should be noted, consistently drive strong shareholder value affords the board the benefit of the doubt with respect to an [public] offer which, all else held equal, does not appear to materially deviate from recent regional and industry trends."

ISS’ Commentary

In its April 04, 2025 report, ISS highlighted that the Dissident neither substantiated its need for a seat on the Board nor to call a special meeting:

  • "While there could potentially be benefits to having a large shareholder on the board, it is challenging to clearly discern this need on the basis of evidence presented by the dissident or on the basis of the company's long-term performance, which has been relatively strong from an operational, financial, and TSR perspective. The mechanics of this meeting have also placed shareholders under what appears to be unnecessary pressure."

  • "Given DNG's disclosure that it would consider the matters raised by the dissident at the June AGM, and the apparent lack of urgency, it is unclear why this special meeting is the best forum to consider these matters."