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(Bloomberg Opinion) -- The U.S. is deploying its economic weaponry as never before, using unilateral sanctions to punish China for the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and its treatment of Uighur minorities in the country's northwest. Western experience with Russia suggests Washington's efforts to force a change of behavior are unlikely to succeed, even if the measures remain in place for years.
Washington blacklisted a powerful Chinese conglomerate and officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang at the end of July, just as President Donald Trump suggested he would ban popular Chinese-owned video app TikTok. In early August, weeks after Beijing imposed a national security law on Hong Kong, the White House took the most dramatic step of all, targeting the territory’s leader, Carrie Lam, and a handful of others. The Hong Kong Autonomy Act passed by the U.S. in July may expand that group, and target their bankers, too.
The U.S. sanctions machinery has generally been targeted at smaller, rogue states. Not always, though. Russia has been under progressively tougher measures since 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the downing of a passenger aircraft over Ukraine. The Russian economy, before punitive action, was twice the size of all others under U.S. sanctions combined. Targeting the world’s second-largest economy represents another step up. Still, experience offers some hints of what can be expected.
The first Russian lesson is that success is distant, no matter how victory is defined. Certainly, European and U.S. efforts haven’t prompted a U-turn in Crimea. Such a drastic policy reversal would be unusual in any event. A study of sanctions by economist Manuel Oechslin, now at the University of Lucerne, finds that using them to promote regime change in autocracies — at the extreme end of possible outcomes, but a frequent target — has a negligible hit rate. He cites figures showing that between 1914 and 2000, out of 57 episodes, only 12 were at least partly successful.
Yet sanctions aren’t just about compelling governments to change. They are also aimed at constraining further moves, encouraging political settlements, and signaling to domestic and international audiences. It’s possible to argue that sanctions encouraged Russian restraint in Eastern Ukraine. That matters for Hong Kong and China: While Washington may not be able to reverse the territory’s reduced autonomy, increasing the opportunity cost may encourage Beijing to tread more cautiously.
Yet such effects are questionable, and difficult to measure. There is plenty of evidence that Russia and its oligarchs have adapted, expecting sanctions won’t be reversed, and that the economy is more self-reliant, even if sluggish. Simply, the Kremlin has shown itself willing to bear the cost of holding onto Crimea. China, for which Hong Kong is a non-negotiable issue of territorial integrity, is even better equipped to pursue such a policy.